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ABSTRACT 
 
 
From Low Income, High Poverty to High Income, No Poverty?  
An Optimistic View of the Long-Run Evolution of Poverty in Indonesia 
by International Poverty Lines, 1984–2030 
Andy Sumner and Peter Edward 
 
 
Indonesia has achieved well-documented and drastic improvements in average incomes and in 
the reduction of poverty. Much research has discussed this progress. This paper adds to the 
literature with a new perspective. We discuss poverty in Indonesia using the international poverty 
lines ($1.25, $2 and we add $10 per day). We generate historic estimates of poverty and to make 
projections based on various growth and inequality trends. We find that Indonesia has the 
potential to attain high-income country status in a decade or so and at the same time the 
potential to end $1.25 per day and $2 per day poverty, but this would require favorable changes 
in distribution. Looking ahead, the end of poverty in Indonesia may be accompanied by a large 
proportion of the population vulnerable to poverty for some considerable time to come, 
suggesting public policy priorities may need to balance insurance and risk management 
mechanisms with more “traditional” poverty policy. We also find, in contrast to national poverty 
line analysis, that poverty by the various international poverty lines, is considerably more 
urbanized, with more than half the poor residing in urban areas currently and the urban 
proportion of total poverty likely to rise further in the years ahead. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Indonesia has achieved well-documented and drastic improvements in average incomes and in 
the reduction of poverty. Much research has discussed this progress. However, in recent years the 
context for poverty reduction in Indonesia has increasingly become a discussion of slowing rates 
of poverty reduction (see Suryahadi, Hadiwidjaja, and Sumarto, 2012) and how to maintain rates 
of reduction to meet the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJM) national poverty (LHS) 
target of 8–10% by 2014.1 Further, vulnerability to poverty remains an issue with almost 40% of 
the population living in the range of 1.5 times the national poverty line (World Bank, 2012c). 
 
This paper adds to the literature with an alternative and complementary perspective, discussing 
trends and patterns of poverty reduction by using international poverty lines ($1.25, $2 and we 
add $10 per day). We use a model of growth, inequality, and poverty for historic estimates and 
project forward poverty reduction patterns by various growth and inequality trends in order 
to ascertain the possible future levels for poverty based on different assumptions. 
 
We are, of course, not the first to consider the long-run evolution of poverty in Indonesia. Indeed, 
a number of studies we review have considered the evolution of poverty by the national poverty 
line (see discussion below). However, to the authors’ knowledge, no paper has yet considered the 
evolution of poverty by the international poverty lines, for headcount and gap measures for total, 
urban, and rural components, nor made poverty projections on various scenarios. We also discuss 
trends in inequality and the distribution pattern of growth. 
  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of Indonesian development 
since 1984 and reviews the literature relating to the long-run evolution of poverty (and inequality) 
in Indonesia. Section 3 outlines our methodology and section 4 our findings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
II. INDONESIAN DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1984 
 
 
2.1 Economic Development 
 
Gross national income (GNI) per capita (using the Atlas method—exchange rate conversion 
applied to categorize countries’ income status) in Indonesia grew from US$540 in 1984 to 
US$2,940 per capita in 2011 (see figure 1). Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita based on 
purchasing power party (PPP) (2005 constant $) grew from US$1,500 to almost US$4,100 per 
capita (see Figure 1) during the same period.2 In short, GNI per capita (using the Atlas method) 
increased almost six-fold and average incomes by PPP are just a few years away from tripling. 
Average PPP income stood at about US$11 per day per capita in 2011. Few countries have 
achieved such a drastic change. In fact, the Commission on Growth and Development (2008: 20) 
identified just 13–15 countries which had achieved average growth rates of 7% a year or more for 
25 years or longer at which the speed of the economy doubles in size every ten years. The group 
                                                 
1As of March 2012, the national poverty line headcount was 12% (World Bank, 2012c). 
2WDI (2013) data. 
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includes four countries in Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam.3 That said, 
there was a noticeable dip following the 1997–1998 financial crisis and the long-run poverty 
impact of the crisis has been contentious. 
 
Not surprisingly, official development assistance (ODA), indicators of development, as both a 
proportion of GNI and gross capital formation has been on a downward trajectory from what was 
a relatively low point by the early 1990s (albeit with a rise around the 1997–1998 crisis) (see 
Figure 2). Moreover, indicators of structural change in terms of economic development also show 
major shifts since the 1980s (and the process of transformation can be traced to before) (see 
figures 3 and 4). These shifts included the increasing importance of non-agricultural sectors to 
GDP and the labor force (although noticeable reverse trends emerged around the 1997–1998 
crisis). 
 
Services have increased as a share of employment but fallen as a share of GDP value added. In 
contrast, employment growth in industry is flat whilst industry’s share of GDP value added has 
risen. Several studies (see section 2.2) have argued that this economic growth in the services 
sector is more beneficial to the poor than economic growth in the agriculture sector. 
 
However, in spite of major structural changes, export dependency on primary commodities 
remains significant and has even risen over the period to around 10% of merchandise exports. In 
short, despite its economic development, Indonesia retains some characteristics of poorer 
nations—notably primary export dependency and high $2 poverty levels. 
 
 
Figure 1. Indonesia: Income per capita, 1984–2011 
Source: WDI (2013). 
                                                 
3Booth (1999) argued that initial conditions were crucial in differentiating this more recent Southeast Asian miracle 
from the older East Asian ‘miracle’. 
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Figure 2. Indonesia, ODA indicators, 1984–2011 
Source: WDI (2013). 
 
 
Figure 3. Indonesia, sectoral proportion of GDP, 1984–2011 
Source: WDI (2013). 
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Figure 4. Indonesia, sectoral proportion of labor force, 1984–2011 
Source: WDI (2013). 
 
Indonesia, though, fares reasonably well in relative assessments to other countries. Although 
Indonesia’s $2 poverty rate is surprisingly higher than poorer Southeast Asian neighbors such as 
Vietnam (Table 1), when Indonesia is compared to the averages of each income group (see Table 
2 and Suryahadi, Hadiwidjaja, and Sumarto, 2012; Sumner, 2012d), Indonesia is certainly much 
closer to the upper middle-income group average in terms of ODA indicators. However, Indonesia 
is closer to the lower middle-income group weighted mean in terms of the proportional increase 
in GDP PPP per capita since 1990, the contribution of agriculture to GDP, and closer to the low-
income group weighted mean in terms of primary export dependency. 
 
If one compares income per capita in Indonesia and the country groups as a percentage of OECD 
high-income countries (HICs), in PPP terms, income per capita in Indonesia in 1990 was 18% of 
OECD high-income countries’ weighted average and only slightly rose to 19% in 2008 (above the 
low-income countries’ weighted mean and some distance from the upper middle-income country 
average). 
 
Table 1. Indonesia: Economic Indicators Relative to Cambodia and Vietnam 
Country 
Poverty rate  
(% poor at $2  
PPP a day) 
GDP per capita, 
PPP  
(constant 2005 $) 
GDP in non-
agricultural sectors 
(% of GDP) 
Exports of primary 
commodities  
(% of GDP) 
1995-
2000 
2005-
2010 
1995-
2000 
2005-
2010 
1995-
2000 
2005-
2010 
1995-
2000 
2005-
2010 
Indonesia 66.97 54.36 2,710.42 3,480.90 82.85 85.88 13.16 14.68 
Cambodia 70.79 53.24 898.65 1,783.78 55.15 66.30 7.66 3.37 
Vietnam 68.71 43.33 1,424.50 2,527.13 73.95 79.10 18.60 28.58 
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Table 2. Indonesia: Economic Indicators Relative to Country Groupings, 
Population Weighted 
Economic Indicators, 2010 (or nearest year) Indonesia LICs LMICs UMICs 
Net ODA received (% of GNI) 0.2 12.6 1.0 0.1 
Net ODA received (% of gross capital formation) 0.6 53.1 3.5 0.4 
GDP of agriculture (%) 15.3 30.8 17.3 8.8 
Agriculture as a % of total employment 38.3 n.a. 11.8 17.9 
Urban population (% of total) 49.9 27.9 39.2 56.8 
Agricultural raw materials (% of merchandise exports) 6.6 9.7 1.9 1.1 
Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) 9.9 7.4 5.9 4.3 
Convergence with High-Income OECD     
GDP pc (PPP 2005 $) as a % HIC OECD, 1990 18 7 16 37 
GDP pc (PPP 2005 $) as a % HIC OECD, 2008 19 6 16 43 
GDP pc (PPP 2005 $) (1990 = 100) 178 138 188 355 
Source: Sumner (2012d) based on data processed from World Bank (2012b). 
 
 
2.2 Empirical Studies of the Evolution of Income Poverty (and 
Distribution) in Indonesia 
 
There have been a large number of studies on poverty in Indonesia published since the Asian 
financial crisis that make use of data from the 1980s, 1990s, and onwards. Our review of the 
literature using Thomson Reuter’s (ISI) Web of Knowledge online database and working papers of 
research institutes found almost 60 articles.4 
 
Not surprisingly, many of the included studies are based on time series analyses of the national 
socioeconomic survey (Susenas) by Statistics Indonesia (BPS) which are available for every three 
years from 1984 to 2002, and every year from 2002 onwards. There are also a few studies that 
draw on data from the National Labor Force Survey (Sakernas), which has annual data from 1986 
onwards, and the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS—produced by the RAND Corporation and 
partners) that can be used to estimate expenditure poverty and have been particularly used to 
study chronic and transient poverty. 
 
The studies identified can be grouped into three themes relevant to the current discussion of this 
paper on the evolution of poverty over time: first, there are studies focused on long-run trends in 
expenditure poverty. Second, studies focused on the long-run relationship between expenditure 
poverty and economic growth. Third, studies which are focused on long-run inequality trends. 
 
Studies focused on long-run trends in expenditure poverty typically use Susenas survey data over 
a long period of time, and use either BPS’s national monetary poverty lines or a variation of the 
poverty lines calculated by Pradhan (2001). The consensus from these studies is as follows: 
consistent with the data provided in Section 2.1, absolute poverty declined in Indonesia during 
the Suharto years (Asra 2000; Booth 2000; Friedman 2005). However, poverty was still significant 
                                                 
4See Sumner (2012c). The selected studies were found in the Thomson Reuter’s (ISI) Web of Knowledge online database 
using the keywords: “Indonesia AND (poverty OR inequality)”. There is, of course, a bias that only studies published in 
English are included. That said, a large number of these studies identified are written by Indonesian scholars. 
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before the 1997–1998 financial crisis, and may have been underestimated due to national poverty 
lines being set too low (Asra 2000). Further, welfare improvements slowed in the period after the 
1997–1998 crisis (Friedman 2005; Friedman and Levinsohn 2002; Lanjouw et al. 2001; Skoufias et 
al. 2000; Suryahadi et al., 2012). Much of this was due to an increase in chronic long-run poverty 
(Suryahadi and Sumarto 2001, 2003a, 2003b). Furthermore, vulnerability to poverty has also 
increased, resulting in a large number of households experiencing transient or short-term poverty 
(Suryahadi and Sumarto, 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Pritchett et al., 2000; Widyanti, Sumarto, 
Suryahadi, 2001). For example, using IFLS data, Dartanto and Nurkholis (2013) argue that, 
between 2005–2007, 28% of the poor in Indonesia were chronically poor and 7% of the nonpoor 
were vulnerable to poverty.5 
 
There is some disagreement in the literature over how quickly Indonesia recovered from the 
financial crisis in terms of poverty levels. Those arguing that it recovered quickly or that the social 
consequences were less severe than anticipated include Suryahadi and Sumarto (2003a, 2003b). 
In contrast, those arguing that the consequences were more significant and/or long term include 
Dhanani and Islam (2002) and Ravallion and Lokshin (2007). To a certain extent, use of different 
poverty indicators plays a part in the different findings. However, research suggests Indonesia 
coped with the more recent global financial crisis of 2008–2009 relatively well in terms of poverty 
due to its moderate economic impact on the country (McCulloch and Grover, 2010). 
 
Indeed, Suryahadi, Hadiwidjaja, and Sumarto (2012) note poverty has only risen twice in 
Indonesia: during the 1996–1999 economic crisis due to job losses and hyperinflation and again in 
2005–2006 due to inflation caused by domestic fuel price rises and the rises in the cost of rice 
(which were caused by the 2004 ban on rice imports—see McCulloch, 2008). 
 
Susenas data, and either the national BPS monetary poverty lines or a variation of the poverty 
lines calculated by Pradhan et al. (2001) are typically used in studies focused on the long-run 
relationship between expenditure poverty and economic growth. These studies share the 
following consensus: overall, economic growth in Indonesia has benefited the poor, with a high 
and stable growth elasticity of poverty even after the 1997–1998 crisis (Baliscan, Pernia, Asra, 
2003; Friedman, 2005; Suryahadi, Hadiwidjaja, and Sumarto, 2012; Timmer, 2004). However, 
economic growth in different sectors is associated with quite different impacts on poverty, 
notably economic growth in the services sector, as noted above, is found to be more beneficial to 
the incomes of the poor than economic growth in agriculture (Fane and Warr, 2002; Suryahadi et 
al., 2006 and Suryahadi, Hadiwidjaja, and Sumarto, 2012). This is significant as rural poverty 
dominates the poverty count in Indonesia when the national poverty line is used (see later 
discussion). Suryahadi, Hadiwidjaja, and Sumarto (2012: 216) estimate rural poverty as two-thirds 
of total poverty in 2010 as do Dartanto and Nurkholis (2013). 
 
Studies focused on long-run inequality again typically use the Susenas and compute the Gini 
coefficient or the Theil index. The findings are as follows: before the 1997–1998 crisis, there is 
general agreement that inequality was relatively low or declining (Akita, Kurniawan, and Miyata, 
2011), and inequality had not increased drastically as a result of economic growth (van der Eng, 
2009), and was offset by gains from this growth (Cameron, 2000). However, there are some 
detractors from this, arguing that inequality was high or increasing pre-crisis (Frankema and 
Marks, 2009; Leigh and van der Eng, 2010; van Leeuwen and Foldvari, 2012) and overall, growth 
has been largely distributionally neutral, although areas such as Java have grown slightly faster 
than the national average (Hill, 2008; Hill et al., 2008) and inequality has increased post-crisis—
                                                 
5They link poverty to educational attainment, number of household members, physical assets, employment status, 
health shocks, the microcredit programs, access to electricity, and changes in employment sector, and employment 
status. 
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mainly intra-group and urban-rural inequality (Akita, 2002; Akita and Miyata, 2008; Skoufias, 
2001; Sumarto, Vothknecht, and Wijaya, 2014; Suryadarma et al., 2005, 2006; Yusuf and Rum, 
2013). 
 
The causes of recent changes in inequality are complex. Five possible inter-related reasons are: (i) 
although high-income groups are missing in the data (see Leigh and van der Eng, 2010: 173), BPS 
recently sought to make efforts to address this (Cornwell and Anas, 2013: 27), meaning that 
recorded inequality may have risen as a result; (ii) there are large differences in provincial-level 
Ginis (and the highest Ginis are in the more developed provinces) (Sumarto et al., 2014); (iii) 
Indonesia is experiencing a commodity boom in coal and palm oil in particular (Burke and 
Resosudarmo, 2012) and this is impacting on inequality; (iv) relatedly, Suryahadi, Hadiwidjaja, and 
Sumarto, (2012) note changing sectoral contributions to growth are associated with slowing 
poverty reduction, and thus potentially with changes in inequality; and (v) Yusuf et al., (2013) 
propose one more hypothesis on labor market rigidity in the formal labor market including inter-
related changes in labor market regulation—an increase in the severance payment rate, the 
strengthening of labor unions, rising minimum wages, reduced demand for unskilled labor, and an 
increase in informality in lower wage employment. 
 
 
 
III. INDONESIA AND INTERNATIONAL 
POVERTY LINES: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The Growth, Inequality and Poverty (GrIP) model is a global model developed to compare trends 
in poverty and inequality over time across countries and across different input assumptions, and 
make projections. The GrIP model was developed from an earlier model described in Edward 
(2006) and is described in-depth in Edward and Sumner (2013a; 2013b ). The main objective of 
the GrIP model is to construct a truly global model of consumption distribution that allows ready 
comparison of different assumptions (such as the use of survey means or national account [NA] 
means). Survey distributions (quintile and upper and lower decile data) are taken (in the following 
order of preference) from the World Bank’s online analysis poverty tool PovcalNet, World 
Development Indicators (WDI), or the United Nations University’s (UNU) World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) Version 2.0c database (May 2008). Survey means are taken from PovcalNet and 
NA means are taken from WDI (all analysis and results are in 2005 PPP $). This approach enables 
the model to cover more countries than just those in PovcalNet.6 
 
In terms of Indonesia, the data extracted from the GrIP model is as follows: 
 Decile values and survey means are taken from PovcalNet which provides data at three-
yearly intervals from 1984–2005 and annually thereafter up to 2011 (values for 
intermediate years are determined by interpolation). 
 Household final consumption (HFC) data are taken from WDI which provides annual data 
throughout the 1984–2011 period; and 
                                                 
6This feature, which is predominantly introduced so that the model can be used to look at the entire global 
consumption (or income) distribution and not just at the lowest income regions, is particularly useful when 
investigating issues such as the emergence of a global middle-class and identifying winners and losers in the 
globalization process. 
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 We take population data for the urban and rural from Povcalnet for all the survey years 
except 2011 which is not presented. For 2011 we estimate from the trends for the urban-
rural shares from earlier years. The urban-rural split in the forecast populations (see 
appendix) is based on a linear extrapolation of the change in the shares from 1990–2010 
which is then applied to the UN total population forecast. 
 
We treat pre-1990 data with some caution and supply figures in the appendix based on different 
base years.7 In order to produce future projections of income and poverty we use somewhat 
similar assumptions to those in Karver, Kenny, and Sumner (2012) but derive the forecast rates 
from more recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO) figures. 
This means the estimates are based on the average growth rate from 2010–2017. We therefore 
use the following three scenarios for GDP PPP growth estimates as the forecast growth rate for 
2010–2030:8 
 “Optimistic economic growth scenario”: a scenario that assumes the average national 
growth rate in the WEO is sustained to any point in the future (this produces an average 
of 6.7% per annum for Indonesia); 
 “Moderate economic growth scenario”: a scenario that is the same as “optimistic growth” 
but minus 1% (based on the historic error of IMF projections—see Aldenhoff, 2007) (this 
produces an average of 5.7% per annum for Indonesia); and 
 “Pessimistic economic growth scenario”: a scenario that is 50% of “optimistic growth” 
(this produces an average of 3.4% per annum for Indonesia). 
 
It is worth noting that the actual growth rates in comparison to these scenarios (see Figure 5) as 
such comparison would suggest the growth rates of the 1987–1997 period would be required. 
Growth rates for the more recent period of 2000–2011 are closer to 3–5% per annum, which is 
closer to the pessimistic scenario. That said growth rates over the last five years have typically 
been about 5% per annum, which may suggest the moderate growth scenario is more plausible 
(and presumably the basis of the IMF’s projections to some considerable extent). 
 
                                                 
7There are some questions about the use of Susenas data pre-1990. The expansion of Susenas to 200,000 households 
took place in 1993. 
8When selecting these scenarios we also considered similar scenarios used by others: (a) assume the IMF’s furthest out 
WEO forecast rate (2016–2017 in our case) is the best estimate of medium-term growth rate and apply this to all years 
post-2017; (b) use WEO forecasts up to 2017 but beyond those cut long-term growth rates in half (i.e. to 50% of the 
2016–2017 rate); (c) subtract 1% from the growth forecast for all years from current year; (d) use historical averages 
from the last 15 years (1995–2010) as the growth forecast for the next 15 years. We do not use these on the following 
basis: (a) and (b) both rely on forecasts for single years being sustained subsequently over the next two decades. Where 
those forecasts yield growth rates higher than our optimistic model then we would be concerned that they could not be 
sustained over such a long period. Where the forecasts show lower growth rates then our optimistic model would over-
estimate growth and hence provide an ‘upper-bound’ estimate—which is what we consider an optimistic model should 
be aiming to provide. With reference to (d), while historical averages may be interesting we are inclined to presume 
that these have already been taken into account in forming the IMF’s WEO forecasts. We do not therefore think that 
there is any reason to suppose that forecasts based on the historical averages are any more justifiable than those 
derived, as ours are, from the WEO forecasts.  
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Figure 5. Indonesia’s historical GDP per capita growth rates, 1960–2011 
Source: World Bank (2012b). 
 
We explore the impact that a dynamic inequality estimate might have on future poverty. We use 
three inequality scenarios to illustrate the impact of different inequality assumptions as follows: 
 “Static inequality”: a scenario with static inequality from 2011 onwards; 
 “Dynamic inequality”: a scenario with dynamic changes in distribution. Future changes are 
estimated by linear extrapolation of the trends calculated from 1990 to 2010 (see Table 
3); and 
 “Best-ever distribution”: a scenario representing a return to the lowest-inequality 
historical distribution in the PovcalNet dataset for Indonesia (which is 1999 for rural 
Indonesia and 1987 for urban Indonesia). 
 
The main purpose of this dynamic inequality analysis is illustrative and to investigate whether the 
assumption of static distribution introduces a significant difference in the calculations. Because 
the dynamic inequality assumption introduces even more uncertainty into the forecasts, we 
prefer only to extend those forecasts out to 2030. Recognizing that within-country inequality can 
decrease, we explore the significance of the impact of this by providing forecasts calculated using 
a “best” (i.e. most equal) historical distribution for Indonesia. The “best distribution” is the survey 
distribution that had the lowest ratio of the highest quintile to the lowest quintile (Q5/Q1). 
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Table 3. Percentage Share of Consumption, 2015–2030, Extrapolated  
Inequality on Current Trends 
 
Lowest 
10% 
Lowest 
20% 
20% to 
40% 
40% to 
60% 
60% to 
80% 
Top 20% Top 10% 
 
D1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 D10 
2015        
Urban 3.65 8.08 11.55 15.96 22.66 41.75 25.64 
Rural 3.03 6.96 10.78 15.58 22.92 43.76 26.86 
2020        
Urban 3.46 7.53 10.75 15.5 23.1 43.12 26.08 
Rural 3.06 7.01 10.91 16.06 24.05 41.97 24.01 
2025        
Urban 3.27 6.98 9.95 15.04 23.54 44.49 26.52 
Rural 3.09 7.06 11.04 16.54 25.18 40.18 21.16 
2030        
Urban 3.08 6.43 9.15 14.58 23.98 45.86 26.96 
Rural 3.12 7.11 11.17 17.02 26.31 38.39 18.31 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
Again, if we compare the historical record, we would be more likely to err towards caution on 
likely changes in inequality, noting the causes of inequality in Indonesia are complex and relate to 
spatial inequality in particular (see earlier discussion). Figures 6 to 8 show the Gini and Theil 
measures and decile groupings for 1984–2011 based on the GrIP data. The graphs show rising 
inequality over the period in Indonesia in several waves with a clear spike in inequality in 2005 
that fell back before rising quickly again. The graphs are consistent with the story of the density 
curves and fractile graphs below, in that although poverty fell and growth was broad-based at the 
lower end of the distribution, there were more significant gains in the middle and at the top end 
of the distribution and thus inequality rose.  
 
Of concern to policy makers is that rising inequality will slow the rate of poverty reduction but 
also it may slow growth too or the length of the growth episode. Cornia, Addison, and Kiiski 
(2004), who use a dataset of 73 countries to identify critical threshold levels of inequality. They 
conclude that rising inequality can assist growth but only up to a Gini value of 0.30 and above 0.45 
inequality impedes GDP growth (Indonesia’s Gini is moving close to this level). In short, they find a 
distinct nonlinear relationship between initial income inequality and economic growth. They 
argue that a low level of inequality is bad for growth (free-riding, high supervision costs), but also 
that too high levels of inequality can have serious negative consequences.  
 
The conclusion above is consistent with the global literature. There is substantial empirical 
evidence that high or rising inequality has a negative effect on the rate of growth or the length of 
growth spells (e.g. Berg and Ostry, 2011; Easterly, 2005). There is some evidence that this 
depends on level of economic development (GDP per capita) and “openness” (Agénor, 2002; 
Barro, 2000; Milanovic, 2002) and assets rather than income (Deininger and Olinto, 2000) with an 
emphasis on human capital in particular. Further, that a higher level of inequality leads to less 
poverty reduction at a given level of growth (Deininger and Squire, 1998; Hanmer and Naschold, 
2001; Kraay, 2004; Ravallion, 1995; 1997; 2001; 2004; 2005; Son and Kakwani, 2003; Stewart, 
2000). This is, though, not given as there is a high level of heterogeneity of country experience 
(see Fosu, 2011; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; Ravallion, 2001) which points towards the role of 
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policy in influencing the sectoral and geographical pattern of economic growth, as well as the 
composition of public expenditure, especially social spending and labor market policies (Fields, 
2001; Kraay, 2004; Ravallion, 1995).  
 
There is further a question of whether to use survey or national accounts means. In this paper we 
use survey means because this most closely replicates the method used by the World Bank. 
Elsewhere we have used the GrIP model to compare poverty estimates by both survey and NA 
means (see Edward and Sumner, 2013a and 2013b). When NA means are used lower poverty 
estimates are generated compared to survey means (see Table 4). We would therefore anticipate 
that estimates of global poverty that use NA means would understate Indonesian poverty when 
compared to estimates from Povcal (in fact, many of those estimates would understate 
Indonesian poverty by more than Table 4 because in general they use HFC means without the 
global adjusting that GrIP includes to allow for the fact that HFC means are generally higher than 
survey means). Table 4 shows the differences between poverty counts (millions of people) for 
each poverty line by survey and NA means. 
 
 
Figure 6. Theil, 1984—2011 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure 7. Gini, 1984–2011 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
Figure 8. Share of GNI to poorest 40%, middle 50%, and top 10%, 1984–2011 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table 4. Indonesia, Poverty Headcount (millions), 2010, Survey and NA Means 
 $1.25 $2 $10 
 
Survey 
mean 
NA mean 
Survey 
mean 
NA 
mean 
Survey 
mean 
NA mean 
Total 43.2 2.4 108.7 49.7 236.8 225.2 
Urban 23.5 2.2 55.1 26.6 125.7 117.0 
Rural 19.7 0.2 53.7 23.0 111.1 108.1 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
Finally, we make use of international poverty lines of $1.25, $2 and add a $10 poverty line. The 
logic for this is as follows. First, the $1.25 line is, as Yusuf et al. (2013) notes, approximately 
equivalent to the current PPP $ value of the national poverty line (see Table 5). In fact, the 
national poverty line has been close to the $1.25 international poverty line over the last five 
years.9 
 
We include the $2 poverty line because it is well established as the World Bank moderate 
international poverty line, which is close to the median poverty line across all developing 
countries ($2.36 per capita [pc] in 2008) as well as the regional mean poverty line in sub-Saharan 
Africa, South Asia, and China collectively, where many of the world’s poor live (Ravallion, 2012: 
25). The global mean for developing country poverty lines is $4.64 pc which is significantly higher 
than the median because poverty lines can be around $11–$12 pc. The mean in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, and Eastern Europe is close to $4, which also is the mean in East Asia and Pacific 
(Ravallion, 2012: 25). In short, $2 pc seems reasonable because, from an international 
perspective, it is close both to the global median and to the mean poverty line in the countries 
where most of the world’s poor live (Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and China). 
 
We also use a $10 per day per capita poverty line on the basis that this threshold broadly 
separates those living “rich-world” lifestyles from those living “developing world” lifestyles.10 
Given that there is an inevitable degree of arbitrariness in the precise location of these thresholds 
the $10 level seems a reasonable point of separation, and $10 has been identified as an 
approximate “security” from the poverty line: an interesting study in Chile, Mexico and Brazil 
suggests that the risk of falling into poverty was as low as approximately 10% at an initial income 
of $10 per day per capita in all three countries. The authors refer to this as a ‘vulnerability 
approach to identifying the middle classes’ (López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez, 2011). Further, Birdsall, 
Lustig, and Meyer (2013) noted that $10 is the mean per capita income of those who have 
completed secondary school across Latin America suggesting such completion of schooling can be 
associated with some kind of greater security.11 We have proposed that those living above $2 per 
day but below the $10 per day level might be referred to as the “global insecure”, while those 
above it would be the “global secure” (see discussion in Edward and Sumner, 2013b). 
 
                                                 
9The national poverty line was revised in 1998. The national poverty line is based on the cost of 2,100 calories and 
essential non-food items (see for discussion, Sumner, 2002). 
10This is discussed in-depth in Edward and Sumner (2013b). From GrIP, 87% of the HIC population lives above $10 pc a 
day. 98% of LIC and LMIC populations are below this level. If we wished to exactly balance out the LIC/HIC separation 
we would need a threshold of $7, which would position 94% of the HIC population above the threshold and 94% of the 
LIC and LMIC population below it. 
11Ravallion (2012) uses a higher threshold, the US poverty line of $13 pc. 
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Table 5. National Poverty Line Versus $1.25 PPP Poverty Line, 2007–2012 
 
Poverty Line Rp/month per person 
PPP 2005 (Rp/$) CPI PPP (Rp/$) 
Poverty Line $PPP/month per person Poverty Line $PPP/day 
 
Urban Rural 
Urban+ 
Rural 
Urban Rural 
Urban+ 
Rural 
Urban Rural 
Urban+ 
Rural 
1996 42,032 31,366  4193 30 1,278 32.9 24.5  1.08 0.81  
1997    4193 32 1,358       
1998 96,959 72,780  4193 51 2,150 45.1 33.8  1.48 1.11  
1999 92,409 74,272  4193 62 2,591 35.7 28.7  1.17 0.94  
2000 91,632 73,648  4193 64 2,687 34.1 27.4  1.12 0.90  
2001 100,011 80,382  4193 71 2,996 33.4 26.8  1.10 0.88  
2002 130,499 96,512  4193 80 3,352 38.9 28.8  1.28 0.95  
2003 138,803 105,888  4193 85 3,573 38.8 29.6  1.28 0.97  
2004 143,455 108,725  4193 91 3,796 37.8 28.6  1.24 0.94  
2005 150,799 117,259  4193 100 4,193 36.0 28.0  1.18 0.92  
2006 174,290 130,584  4193 113 4,743 36.7 27.5  1.21 0.91  
2007 187,942 146,837 166,697 4193 120 5,047 37.2 29.1 33.0 1.22 0.96 1.09 
2008 204,896 161,831 182,636 4193 132 5,540 37.0 29.2 33.0 1.22 0.96 1.08 
2009 222,123 179,835 200,262 4193 138 5,806 38.3 31.0 34.5 1.26 1.02 1.13 
2010 232,989 192,354 211,726 4193 146 6,105 38.2 31.5 34.7 1.25 1.04 1.14 
2011 253,016 213,395 233,740 4193 153 6,432 39.3 33.2 36.3 1.29 1.09 1.19 
2012 277,382 240,441 259,520 4193 160 6,708 41.3 35.8 38.7 1.36 1.18 1.27 
Source: Yusuf et al. (2013). 
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Table 6. Comparison of Ginis from GrIP, BPS, and Povcal 
Year 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
BPS 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.41 
Povcal 0.305 0.293 0.292 0.293 0.313 0.290 0.297 0.340   0.341  0.356  
GrIP 0.304 0.291 0.295 0.299 0.322 0.304 0.311 0.358 0.329 0.344 0.339 0.339 0.353 0.386 
 
 
      16 The SMERU Research Institute 
In terms of validating our data, we take the Gini ratio from GrIP and compare with those of BPS 
(and Povcal). We find a reasonably close correlation (see Table 6). The GrIP model tends to 
underestimate Ginis in individual countries due to the way that the model extrapolates and 
interpolates across the distribution. GrIP uses a method for estimating fractile shares of income 
from ventiles and deciles. It is extremely difficult to estimate from this data the detail distribution 
across (particularly) the top 5% of the distribution. The method in GrIP is designed to be 
inherently conservative in this region (see Edward, 2006: 1692) so that GrIP tends to slightly 
underestimate Gini coefficients for individual countries. With access to the full survey data we 
expected the Indonesian Government numbers would be slightly higher, which they are. 
Interestingly, Povcal also underestimates the national Gini while GrIP’s estimate seems to be very 
close to Povcal. Maybe, if anything, Povcal is slightly better in that it is often closer to the 
government figures. 
 
As is well known, expenditure survey data (namely data from Indonesia’s Susenas and thus Povcal 
too) understates income inequality since it ignores savings (for example), whilst top incomes 
largely escape surveys (see for details: Leigh and van der Eng, 2010). Those are inherent 
shortcomings of all such surveys, not just Indonesia’s. Therefore, in general, the decile data in 
Povcal on which GrIP is based is widely recognized as likely to underestimate inequality and the 
incomes of the rich—so it is unsurprising that the GrIP results reflect these shortcomings in the 
underlying data. One very interesting recent study by Nugraha and Lewis (2013) argues that when 
using Susenas data the different forms of non-market income should be taken into account. We 
find (see below) that in the GrIP data that the $10 poverty line calls into question the capture of 
information on higher incomes. 
 
A slight difference between GrIP and Povcal arises because Povcal uses a kernel distribution 
method and GrIP uses a linear distribution method to estimate the distribution detail from the 
decile or quintile data. This leads to slightly different estimates of the Lorenz curve and hence of 
the Gini. 
 
 
 
IV. HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND 
PROJECTIONS, 1984–2030 
 
 
In figures 9–21 presented below we can consider growth, distribution and poverty from 1984–
2011 and make projections to 2030 where appropriate. The graphs are grouped by: (a) income 
per capita trends; (b) historical patterns of growth; and (c) trends in poverty overall. 
 
 
4.1 Income per Capita Trends, 1984–2030 
 
The first set of graphs show income per capita. Figures 9 and 10 respectively show GNI per capita 
by the Atlas method and GDP per capita by PPP. Indonesia is compared to a set of populous and 
fast growing economies, namely, China, Brazil, India and Nigeria. The graphs show that Indonesia 
may cross the threshold in the next 1–2 years into the upper middle-income country (UMIC) 
classification and could attain high-income country (HIC) status around 2025. These estimates are 
based on the ‘optimistic’ economic growth scenario (meaning the IMF WEO forecast extrapolated 
out to 2030 at 6.7% a year which is clearly an optimistic scenario). 
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Figure 9. GNI per capita, 1984–2030 (optimistic growth from 2011), Indonesia, China, 
Brazil, India and Nigeria 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
Figure 10. GDP (PPP) per capita, 1984–2030 (optimistic growth from 2011), 
Indonesia, China, Brazil, India and Nigeria 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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4.2 Historical Patterns of Growth, 1984–2011 
 
A second set of graphs show growth distribution trends over the 1984–2011 period. Figures 11 
and 12 show the pattern of that growth in a density curve and a fractile chart. Additional charts 
are included in the appendix with different base years and urban and rural density curves. These 
graphs show the gradual shift of the poverty peak (and decline in size of the peak) between 1984 
and 2011 and thus the emergence of those in the $2–$10 per day group (arguably, between day-
to-day poverty and security from poverty). The rise in consumption is particularly visible in the 
middle and at the top end of the distribution (the bottom half of the graph). The change between 
2000 and 2011 is quite striking.  
 
The growth incidence graph explains further (Figure 12) and shows both the broad base to 
economic growth over the period at the lower end of the distribution and the benefits accruing 
to the top 15–25% of the population over the period (various other graphs by different time 
periods are in the appendix for reference). Further, comparison to Brazil, China, India, and 
Nigeria is largely favorable to Indonesia as the pattern of growth is somewhat similar to China’s 
(see Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 11. Density curve, 1984–2011 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure 12. Indonesia, fractile chart, 1984–, 1990–, 2000–2011 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
Figure 13. Fractile chart, 1990–2011: Indonesia, China, India, Brazil, and Nigeria 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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4.3 Trends in Poverty Reduction Overall, 1984–2030 
 
Finally, poverty trends are presented. Figures 14 to 20 show total, rural and urban poverty 
headcounts in millions of people from 1984–2030 and the total poverty gap in US$bn (2005 PPP$) 
and estimates of urban and rural proportions of poverty by $1.25, $2 and $10 poverty lines.  
 
In considering the historical trends on poverty in Indonesia it is evident that there is a rather 
fluctuating curve for poverty reduction in that the curve is not very smooth. The two spikes in 
poverty are clearly visible Suryahadi, Hadiwidjaja, and Sumarto (2012). 
 
The data suggests the end of $1.25 and $2 poverty is plausible in the 2015–2025 period if growth 
meets the “optimistic” forecast and distribution returned to “best ever”. Surprisingly perhaps, $10 
poverty will only start to fall in 2025. One should note this “end of $1.25 or $2 poverty” scenario 
is unequivocally an optimistic scenario and simply illustrates what is possible (see discussion 
below). And if one accepts the basis of a $10 per capita, “security from poverty” poverty line, the 
end of extreme and moderate poverty could be accompanied by a large potentially insecure 
group (possibly 200 million in 2030) of those between $2 and $10 for some time to come with the 
urban proportion rising notably over time (note the $10 urban line on Figure 17). On the other 
hand one might argue that the fact that high incomes are not well captured in the data gravitates 
against the use of this higher poverty line. Although here in the text, “optimistic economic 
growth” is used, all the data for all other scenarios is presented in the appendix. The emergence 
of a substantial group of the population in between $2–$10 for some time to come raises 
questions for evolving public policy priorities and the balance between insurance and risk 
management mechanisms versus “traditional” poverty policy. One interesting policy taxonomy is 
the Dartono and Nurkholis (2013: 62) grouping of chronic and transient poverty programs.12  
 
A further issue of note is that the rural component of total poverty by each poverty line is falling 
drastically and poverty by international poverty lines is far more urbanized than by the national 
poverty line. In fact, rather than two-thirds of the poor being rural, it is less than half of the poor 
in Indonesia who are rural when one uses international poverty lines. It is commonly thought 
international poverty lines underestimate urban poverty for methodological reasons (see Mitlin 
and Satterthwaite, 2003; Satterthwaite, 2004). Figure 20 shows the urban-rural proportions of 
total poverty. The precise reasons for such differences in the urban-proportion of poverty by 
national and international poverty lines may be due to clustering near the international poverty 
lines.  
  
                                                 
12Chronic poverty programs include School Operational Assistance (BOS), scholarships, conditional cash transfers, the 
National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM), credits to SMEs (microfinance) and the Kecamatan 
(Subdistrict) Development Program (PPK). Transient poverty policies, in contrast, include social safety nets—subsidized 
rice (Raskin), Direct Cash Transfers (BLT) and health insurance for the poor (Askeskin). There are others taxonomies of 
course too (see detailed policy review of Suryahadi et al., 2010). 
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Figure 14. Poverty, total, millions, 1984–2011 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
Figure 15. Poverty headcount, total, millions, 1984–2030 (optimistic growth, three 
distribution scenarios) 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure 16. Total Poverty Gap (TPG), US$bn (PPP), 1984–2030 (optimistic growth, 
three distribution scenarios) 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
Figure 17. Rural and urban poverty, millions, 1984–2011 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure 18. Income poverty, rural, millions, 1984–2030 (optimistic growth, three 
distribution scenarios) 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
Figure 19. Income poverty, urban, millions, 1984–2030 (optimistic growth, three 
distribution scenarios) 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure 20. Rural poverty as a % total 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
An important question to ask is what are the historical comparisons for Indonesia? In short, is 
there any country that had, at some point in the past, the same level of $1.25 per day or $2 per 
day poverty incidence as Indonesia today, and managed to reduce it to near zero in such a short 
time frame? We have noted earlier that the economic growth rates and distribution trends would 
suggest some considerable caution is needed in relation to this data. However, one can make 
comparisons to Thailand’s growth, inequality and poverty trends.13  
  
Thailand, in 1988, had similar levels of $2 poverty as Indonesia today: Thailand in 1988, had a $2 
per day poverty headcount of 41.0% of the population, which fell to just 4.1% of population in 
2010. Even including the 1997–1998 Asian financial crash (and severe contraction accompanying 
this), Thailand’s GDP per capita growth rate for 1988–2011 was 3.8% and inequality was largely 
static between 1988–2006, before it fell in 2006–2011 (the Gini fell from 43.8 in 1988 to 42.4 in 
2006 to 39.4 in 2010). 
 
Thus to make the comparison more robust we can take the higher poverty line of $2 per day 
(rather than the $1.25 per day) and the moderate growth scenario (5.7% pc per annum) and 
static inequality (rather than falling inequality which would all speed up the end of poverty). 
Making such assumptions we can compare Indonesia, 2010–2030 and Thailand, 1990–2010 (see 
Figure 21). In short, the historical comparison to Thailand is of interest because two decades of 
growth at 3.8% per capita per annum and largely static inequality, Thailand reduced $2 poverty 
to under 4% of the population. A somewhat similar pattern of such ‘moderate’ growth and 
static inequality could mean the end of poverty in Indonesia in 2030, especially so if the 1997–
                                                 
13We are indebted to Arief Yusuf for his comments as discussant at the Padjadjaran seminar for the proposal to 
compare Thailand and Indonesia in this way. 
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1999 crisis period is removed from Thailand’s curve. It is worth noting though that the poverty 
curve slowed drastically in Thailand when the $2 poverty headcount reached less than 5% (see 
Figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 21. Poverty by $2 per day in Thailand, 1988–2011 (historical actual) versus 
poverty by $2 in Indonesia 2011–2030 based on moderate growth scenario and 
static inequality 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Indonesia certainly experienced rapid economic development and poverty reduction between 
1984 and 2011. What does historical and forecast analysis of Indonesia’s growth, inequality, and 
poverty using international PPP poverty lines tell us? First, it is plausible that Indonesia may attain 
high-income country status in a decade or so. However, historical growth rates indicate a more 
cautious forecast could be necessary—with 15 years perhaps being a more likely time frame.  
 
Second, it is also mathematically plausible that Indonesia could end $1.25 per day and $2 per day 
poverty in the same time frame if growth meets IMF WEO forecasts and there is a favorable 
movement in distribution. Again, current and historic trends suggest this is highly optimistic. An 
alternative way of looking at this is that the opportunity cost of current inequality trends indicate 
poverty in Indonesia could end within a period of 10–20 years. In terms of comparison, the 
historical “moderate” growth and static inequality achieved by Thailand may be of interest to 
policy makers in Indonesia. 
 
 
1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Thailand year 
$2 a day headcount as percentage of total population Indonesia year 
Indonesia (2011 - 2030) 
Thailand (1988 - 2010) 
$
2
 a
 D
a
y
 H
e
a
d
c
o
u
n
t 
a
s
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
T
o
ta
l 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
      26 The SMERU Research Institute 
Third, however, we note that a large proportion of the population may find themselves between 
day-to-day poverty and security from poverty (defined here as the $10 per day line). Fourth, we 
also note that poverty by international poverty lines seems to be far more urban and on a steep 
trend to a greater urban proportion of poverty.  
  
How different are our findings when using the international poverty lines compared to the 
national poverty line? There were three areas reviewed in this paper: first, studies focused on 
long-run trends in expenditure poverty. Second, studies focused on the long-run relationship 
between expenditure poverty and economic growth. Third, studies focused on long-run 
inequality.  
 
In the first, we noted research using national poverty lines—meaning non-$PPP lines—has 
concluded that absolute poverty declined during the Suharto years. However, poverty was still 
significant before the 1997–1998 financial crisis, and may have been underestimated. Further, 
welfare improvements slowed in the period after the 1997–1998 crisis. Using consistent 
international poverty lines at $1.25 and $2 (recalling the former of which is close now to the 
national poverty line), we find over the 1984–2011 period that $1.25 per day poverty significantly 
declined during the Suharto era. However, the substantial decline of $2 poverty per day seems to 
largely date to the post-Suharto era and the $10 per day poverty count appears to have changed 
surprisingly little in 25 years, according to the data. It is true that even before the 1997–1998 
crisis poverty was still at high levels (more than 40% of population by the $1.25 per day poverty 
line and 80% of population by the $2 per day poverty line). We find the rate of poverty reduction 
by $1.25 per day and $2 per day was particularly fast in the period of 2000–2005, indeed faster 
than in the pre-crisis time and possibly reflects the range of social programs introduced or 
extended in the post-crisis period. However, that rate of poverty reduction is slower since the 
2005–2006 rice price induced poverty spike, notably for the $1.25 poverty count and somewhat 
for the $2 poverty count.  
  
In the second area, studies focused on the long-run relationship between expenditure poverty 
and economic growth, we noted that research based on national poverty line(s) found that 
overall, economic growth in Indonesia has benefited the poor. We find over the 1984–2011 
period that the benefits of growth to those under $2 have been substantial. Indeed, economic 
growth certainly appears to have benefited the poor substantially using the $1.25 or $2 poverty 
lines. Overall growth has been broad-based with regard to the lower end of the distribution and 
Indonesia compares well to other populous countries.  
  
Finally, with regard to long-run trends in inequality, research findings to date have been 
somewhat conflicting. Some have found that before the 1997–1998 crisis, inequality was 
relatively low or declining and that inequality did not increase drastically as a result of economic 
growth, whilst others have found inequality was high or increasing pre-crisis. Further, many have 
noted that inequality has increased post-crisis. We find that total inequality (measured by the Gini 
coefficient and Theil index) fell in the early 1990s (although this masked rising urban inequality as 
it was rural inequality that fell substantially). However, after the 1997–1998 crisis inequality has 
risen in two waves in particular: one wave visible in the data for 1999–2005 and a more recent 
wave 2009–2011. This is alarming in the sense that Indonesia’s rising inequality could slow further 
not only poverty reduction but the rate and longevity of future economic growth. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A1. Gini and Theil, 1984–2011 
Year 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total               
Gini 0.304 0.291 0.295 0.299 0.322 0.304 0.311 0.358 0.329 0.344 0.339 0.339 0.353 0.386 
Theil 0.154 0.144 0.149 0.157 0.184 0.169 0.171 0.233 0.188 0.204 0.197 0.199 0.210 0.261 
Rural               
Gini 0.290 0.274 0.262 0.258 0.273 0.246 0.259 0.292 0.285 0.299 0.297 0.293 0.312 0.337 
Theil 0.140 0.126 0.114 0.111 0.126 0.100 0.113 0.145 0.137 0.151 0.148 0.145 0.160 0.192 
Urban               
Gini 0.330 0.325 0.343 0.349 0.370 0.348 0.342 0.392 0.352 0.369 0.363 0.366 0.377 0.415 
Theil 0.183 0.178 0.200 0.208 0.237 0.214 0.202 0.273 0.215 0.231 0.224 0.231 0.239 0.300 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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APPENDIX 2  
 
Table A2. Share of GNI by Decile Groups, 1984–2011 
 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total               
D1 to D4 21.6 22.5 22.6 22.6 21.7 22.9 22.6 20.4 20.6 19.6 19.9 20.1 18.9 17.6 
D5 to D9 53.5 52.9 52.7 52.4 51.8 52.0 51.9 51.1 52.1 52.4 52.4 51.9 53.1 51.0 
D10 24.9 24.6 24.7 25.0 26.6 25.1 25.6 28.5 27.3 28.0 27.7 28.0 28.0 31.4 
Rural               
D1 to D4 22.2 23.4 23.9 24.2 23.4 24.8 24.3 22.3 22.7 22.0 22.1 22.4 21.0 20.0 
D5 to D9 53.8 53.0 53.5 53.4 52.9 53.8 53.0 52.9 53.2 53.0 53.1 52.8 53.8 52.5 
D10 24.0 23.6 22.6 22.4 23.6 21.5 22.8 24.8 24.1 25.1 24.9 24.8 25.2 27.6 
Urban               
D1 to D4 20.1 20.4 19.6 19.4 18.3 19.9 19.8 17.4 19.3 18.1 18.5 18.5 17.6 16.1 
D5 to D9 53.2 53.1 52.4 51.9 51.3 50.6 51.7 50.1 51.6 52.3 52.2 51.6 52.7 50.3 
D10 26.7 26.5 28.0 28.7 30.4 29.6 28.5 32.6 29.1 29.6 29.3 30.0 29.7 33.6 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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APPENDIX 3  
 
Table A3. Headcount (millions) and Total Poverty Gap (US$bn 2005 PPP), 1984–2011 
Year 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total 
              
$1.25 Headcount 101.9 117.6 98.3 103.8 86.8 99.0 63.9 49.8 66.0 56.2 53.2 49.2 43.2 41.1 
$1.25 TPG 15.9 18.2 13.1 13.7 10.5 12.0 6.0 4.6 7.0 5.4 5.0 4.4 3.6 3.2 
$2 Headcount 144.0 154.8 155.5 162.6 158.1 170.7 145.7 120.4 144.7 127.8 125.8 123.1 108.7 104.9 
$2 TPG 51.5 57.6 49.6 52.1 45.0 50.9 35.4 28.3 36.5 31.1 29.9 28.3 24.7 23.6 
$10 Headcount 164.7 174.8 184.3 193.5 202.3 210.6 219.0 222.7 229.9 231.9 234.5 236.4 236.8 233.7 
$10 TPG 525.2 562.0 576.6 604.6 612.6 648.0 639.0 625.3 664.3 648.0 652.7 653.6 634.4 622.9 
GDP 253.6 292.8 370.2 463.8 581.9 533.5 606.2 705.2 743.9 791.2 838.7 877.6 931.9 992.1 
Population 164.7 174.8 184.3 193.5 202.3 210.6 219.0 227.3 229.9 232.5 235.0 237.4 239.9 242.3 
Rural 
              
$1.25 Headcount 79.0 88.1 71.6 73.6 59.2 65.8 40.2 28.9 37.4 30.1 27.3 23.8 19.7 17.3 
$1.25 TPG 12.3 13.4 9.3 9.5 6.9 8.0 3.7 2.7 4.0 2.8 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.2 
$2 Headcount 108.3 112.6 111.4 112.4 108.9 108.8 92.0 71.0 82.4 70.1 66.8 63.3 53.7 49.6 
$2 TPG 39.6 42.5 36.0 36.8 30.7 33.6 22.3 16.7 20.8 16.9 15.6 14.1 11.7 10.5 
$10 Headcount 123.0 126.0 127.9 128.5 127.7 124.9 121.7 118.0 116.7 115.4 114.0 112.6 111.1 109.7 
$10 TPG 394.7 407.2 404.6 407.4 395.2 393.7 367.2 341.5 348.6 334.1 327.8 320.8 304.3 291.3 
Population 123.0 126.0 127.9 128.5 127.7 124.9 121.7 118.0 116.7 115.4 114.0 112.6 111.1 109.7 
Urban 
              
$1.25 Headcount 22.9 29.5 26.7 30.2 27.6 33.2 23.7 20.9 28.6 26.1 25.9 25.5 23.5 23.8 
$1.25 TPG 3.6 4.8 3.7 4.2 3.6 4.0 2.2 1.9 3.0 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.1 
$2 Headcount 35.7 42.2 44.1 50.2 49.2 62.0 53.7 49.4 62.3 57.7 59.1 59.8 55.1 55.4 
$2 TPG 11.9 15.1 13.6 15.3 14.4 17.3 13.1 11.7 15.7 14.2 14.3 14.2 13.0 13.1 
$10 Headcount 41.7 48.8 56.4 65.0 74.6 85.8 97.3 104.7 113.2 116.5 120.5 123.8 125.7 124.1 
$10 TPG 130.6 154.7 172.0 197.3 217.4 254.3 271.8 283.8 315.7 313.9 324.9 332.8 330.2 331.6 
Population 41.7 48.8 56.4 65.0 74.6 85.8 97.3 109.3 113.2 117.0 120.9 124.8 128.8 132.7 
Source: Author’s estimates.  
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Table A4. Headcount (millions) and Total Poverty Gap (US$bn 2005 PPP), Static Inequality, 2015–2030 
 Survey mean, static inequality,  
pessimistic growth 
Survey mean, static inequality,  
moderate growth 
Survey mean, static inequality,  
optimistic growth 
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Total             
$1.25 Headcount 31.7 19.1 7.3 0.8 19.5 2.0 0.0 0.0 14.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$1.25 TPG 2.0 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$2 Headcount 94.6 80.4 63.1 45.5 78.7 48.0 19.9 0.9 71.8 36.2 6.4 0.0 
$2 TPG 19.6 14.6 9.7 5.5 14.4 6.4 1.4 0.0 12.5 4.0 0.2 0.0 
$10 Headcount 240.1 244.9 248.2 250.2 235.4 236.3 237.0 228.2 233.5 233.2 231.4 199.7 
$10 TPG 624.2 617.4 600.8 573.2 595.1 551.4 485.9 394.4 582.6 521.3 429.5 312.7 
Population 251.9 262.6 271.9 279.7 251.9 262.6 271.9 279.7 251.9 262.6 271.9 279.7 
Rural             
$1.25 Headcount 12.6 6.4 1.2 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$1.25 TPG 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$2 Headcount 44.1 36.6 27.9 19.0 35.9 20.5 6.7 0.0 32.4 14.7 0.7 0.0 
$2 TPG 8.5 6.1 3.8 2.0 6.1 2.3 0.3 0.0 5.1 1.3 0.0 0.0 
$10 Headcount 113.0 114.7 115.6 115.9 110.3 109.6 108.9 108.2 109.2 107.8 106.8 96.5 
$10 TPG 291.6 288.1 280.1 267.6 277.7 257.3 227.9 187.1 271.7 243.6 203.1 146.9 
Population 114.0 118.8 123.0 126.5 114.0 118.8 123.0 126.5 114.0 118.8 123.0 126.5 
Urban             
$1.25 Headcount 19.1 12.7 6.1 0.8 12.8 2.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$1.25 TPG 1.4 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$2 Headcount 50.5 43.8 35.3 26.5 42.8 27.5 13.2 0.9 39.3 21.6 5.6 0.0 
$2 TPG 11.1 8.5 5.9 3.6 8.4 4.0 1.1 0.0 7.3 2.6 0.2 0.0 
$10 Headcount 127.1 130.2 132.6 134.3 125.1 126.7 128.1 120.0 124.3 125.4 124.6 103.2 
$10 TPG 332.6 329.3 320.7 305.6 317.4 294.1 258.0 207.3 311.0 277.6 226.4 165.8 
Population 137.9 143.8 148.8 153.1 137.9 143.8 148.8 153.1 137.9 143.8 148.8 153.1 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table A5. Headcount (millions) and Total Poverty Gap (US$bn 2005 PPP), Extrapolated Current Trends on Inequality, 2015–2030 
 Survey mean, extrapolated current trends 
of inequality, 
pessimistic growth 
Survey mean, extrapolated current trends of 
inequality, 
moderate growth 
Survey mean, extrapolated current trends of 
inequality, 
optimistic growth 
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Total             
$1.25 Headcount 39.5 35.1 29.8 24.2 27.2 12.2 1.4 0.0 22.4 4.8 0.0 0.0 
$1.25 TPG 3.1 2.5 1.9 1.3 1.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
$2 Headcount 102.5 95.4 88.0 79.2 86.1 64.5 44.5 26.1 79.7 52.4 28.7 8.3 
$2 TPG 22.8 20.6 18.2 15.6 17.3 10.9 6.0 2.4 15.2 7.8 2.8 0.3 
$10 Headcount 245.1 251.1 254.0 254.7 241.8 241.2 239.7 234.2 240.1 237.2 234.6 212.2 
$10 TPG 642.5 642.2 633.9 618.2 613.0 576.9 526.6 457.8 600.2 547.7 475.1 383.9 
Population 251.9 262.6 271.9 279.7 251.9 262.6 271.9 279.7 251.9 262.6 271.9 279.7 
Rural             
$1.25 Headcount 15.8 12.2 9.1 6.6 10.3 3.2 0.0 0.0 8.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 
$1.25 TPG 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$2 Headcount 44.7 36.1 28.4 21.8 37.0 23.9 14.0 7.1 34.0 19.1 8.7 1.9 
$2 TPG 9.5 7.5 5.7 4.3 7.1 3.8 1.7 0.6 6.1 2.6 0.7 0.1 
$10 Headcount 102.1 91.1 77.5 62.3 101.9 87.2 71.8 56.9 101.4 85.4 69.9 54.8 
$10 TPG 271.6 234.6 195.1 155.4 259.5 211.1 164.0 119.9 254.0 200.8 149.8 102.3 
Population 102.1 91.2 78.8 64.9 102.1 91.2 78.8 64.9 102.1 91.2 78.8 64.9 
Continued over page 
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 Survey mean, extrapolated current trends 
of inequality, 
pessimistic growth 
Survey mean, extrapolated current trends of 
inequality, 
moderate growth 
Survey mean, extrapolated current trends of 
inequality, 
optimistic growth 
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Urban             
$1.25 Headcount 23.7 22.8 20.7 17.6 16.9 9.0 1.4 0.0 14.2 4.1 0.0 0.0 
$1.25 TPG 2.0 1.7 1.4 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
$2 Headcount 57.8 59.3 59.6 57.4 49.1 40.6 30.5 18.9 45.7 33.3 20.0 6.4 
$2 TPG 13.3 13.1 12.5 11.3 10.3 7.1 4.2 1.8 9.1 5.2 2.0 0.2 
$10 Headcount 143.0 160.0 176.5 192.4 139.9 153.9 167.9 177.2 138.7 151.8 164.7 157.4 
$10 TPG 370.9 407.6 438.8 462.8 353.6 365.8 362.6 337.9 346.2 346.8 325.3 281.5 
Population 149.8 171.3 193.1 214.8 149.8 171.3 193.1 214.8 149.8 171.3 193.1 214.8 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table A6. Headcount (millions) and Total Poverty Gap (US$bn 2005 PPP), Extrapolated Current Trends on Inequality, 2015–2030 
 Survey mean, ‘best-ever’ distribution, 
pessimistic growth 
Survey mean, ‘best-ever’ distribution, 
moderate growth 
Survey mean, ‘best-ever’ distribution, 
optimistic growth 
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Total             
$1.25 Headcount 8.6 1.8 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$1.25 TPG 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$2 Headcount 62.1 45.3 30.6 16.8 45.0 19.8 1.6 0.0 38.9 11.0 0.0 0.0 
$2 TPG 9.5 5.9 3.1 1.1 6.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 
$10 Headcount 246.4 253.3 258.1 258.6 243.3 245.1 241.5 226.8 242.1 240.2 233.0 194.0 
$10 TPG 615.6 603.7 579.7 542.8 582.4 525.6 444.7 337.8 567.9 489.9 380.0 246.6 
Population 251.9 262.6 271.9 279.7 251.9 262.6 271.9 279.7 251.9 262.6 271.9 279.7 
Rural             
$1.25 Headcount 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$1.25 TPG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$2 Headcount 28.5 19.8 12.6 5.9 19.8 7.5 0.1 0.0 16.8 3.3 0.0 0.0 
$2 TPG 4.0 2.3 1.1 0.2 2.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
$10 Headcount 114.0 118.8 122.3 122.1 114.0 116.0 112.7 109.8 114.0 113.0 109.2 98.1 
$10 TPG 292.0 287.3 276.4 259.3 277.2 250.7 214.0 165.7 270.5 234.2 185.0 119.6 
Population 114.0 118.8 123.0 126.5 114.0 118.8 123.0 126.5 114.0 118.8 123.0 126.5 
Continued over page 
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 Survey mean, ‘best-ever’ distribution, 
pessimistic growth 
Survey mean, ‘best-ever’ distribution, 
moderate growth 
Survey mean, ‘best-ever’ distribution, 
optimistic growth 
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Urban             
$1.25 Headcount 6.3 1.8 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$1.25 TPG 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
$2 Headcount 33.6 25.5 18.0 10.9 25.2 12.3 1.4 0.0 22.1 7.8 0.0 0.0 
$2 TPG 5.5 3.6 2.0 0.8 3.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 
$10 Headcount 132.4 134.5 135.8 136.5 129.3 129.1 128.8 117.0 128.1 127.1 123.8 96.0 
$10 TPG 323.6 316.4 303.4 283.6 305.2 274.9 230.7 172.1 297.4 255.7 194.9 127.0 
Population 137.9 143.8 148.8 153.1 137.9 143.8 148.8 153.1 137.9 143.8 148.8 153.1 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table A7. Povcal Urban and Rural Estimates 
Country 
Year Data Pov. line Mean Headcount Pov. gap Squared Watts Gini MLD Population Survey 
 
type (PPP$/mo) ($) (%) (%) pov. gap index index index (mil.) year 
Indonesia 1984 C 38 38.26 62.84 21.36 9.57 0.29 30.47 0.15 164.71 weighted 
Indonesia 1987 C 38 36.08 68.16 23.14 10.11 0.31 29.27 0.14 174.77 weighted 
Indonesia 1990 C 38 43.36 54.27 15.62 6.01 0.21 29.19 0.14 184.35 weighted 
Indonesia 1993 C 38 43.61 54.4 15.67 6.03 0.2 29.31 0.14 193.52 weighted 
Indonesia 1996 C 38 51.55 43.38 11.44 4.13 0.15 31.33 0.16 202.25 weighted 
Indonesia 1999 C 38 47.6 47.7 12.52 4.56 0.16 28.99 0.14 210.61 weighted 
Indonesia 2002 C 38 60.79 29.31 6.03 1.78 0.07 29.74 0.15 219.03 weighted 
Indonesia 2005 C 38 75.45 21.44 4.56 1.46 0.06 34.01 0.19 227.3 weighted 
Indonesia 2008 C 38 72.22 22.64 4.73 1.41 0.06 34.11 0.19 234.96 weighted 
Indonesia 2010 C 38 83.33 18.06 3.3 0.81 0.04 35.57 0.21 239.87 weighted 
Continued over page 
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Country Year Data Pov. line Mean Headcount Pov. gap Squared Watts Gini MLD Population Survey 
  type (PPP$/mo) ($) (%) (%) pov. gap index index index (mil.) year 
Indonesia--Rural 1984 C 38 36.72 65.2 22.15 9.88 0.3 29.22 0.14 123.04 1984 
Indonesia--Rural 1987 C 38 34.75 70.54 23.67 10.18 0.32 27.73 0.13 126.01 1987 
Indonesia--Rural 1990 C 38 40.5 57.12 16.02 6.03 0.21 26.46 0.11 127.94 1990 
Indonesia--Rural 1993 C 38 39.84 58.14 16.36 6.18 0.21 25.97 0.11 128.5 1993 
Indonesia--Rural 1996 C 38 46.05 46.75 11.9 4.2 0.15 27.56 0.13 127.66 1996 
Indonesia--Rural 1999 C 38 41.24 53.42 14.05 5.12 0.18 24.73 0.1 124.85 1999 
Indonesia--Rural 2002 C 38 52.52 33.37 6.76 1.99 0.08 26.07 0.11 121.69 2002 
Indonesia--Rural 2005 C 38 62.79 24.01 5.03 1.61 0.06 29.52 0.14 117.97 2005 
Indonesia--Rural 2006 C 38 55.13 32.12 7.56 2.66 0.1 28.73 0.14 116.75 2006 
Indonesia--Rural 2007 C 38 62.67 26.07 5.36 1.58 0.06 30.17 0.15 115.44 2007 
Indonesia--Rural 2008 C 38 64.33 23.81 4.7 1.35 0.06 29.94 0.15 114.05 2008 
Indonesia--Rural 2009 C 38 66.4 20.69 3.82 1.06 0.04 29.53 0.14 112.58 2009 
Indonesia--Rural 2010 C 38 75.36 17.75 2.93 0.65 0.04 31.45 0.16 111.06 2010 
Indonesia--Rural 2011 C 38 83.65 14.97 2.13 0.4 0.03 34.02 0.19 0 2011 
Continued over page 
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Country Year Data Pov. line Mean Headcount Pov. gap Squared Watts Gini MLD Population Survey 
  type (PPP$/mo) ($) (%) (%) pov. gap index index index (mil.) year 
Indonesia--Urban 1984 C 38 42.82 55.88 19.03 8.64 0.26 33.29 0.18 41.67 1984 
Indonesia--Urban 1987 C 38 39.53 62.02 21.76 9.92 0.31 32.78 0.18 48.76 1987 
Indonesia--Urban 1990 C 38 49.85 47.8 14.71 5.97 0.2 34.66 0.2 56.41 1990 
Indonesia--Urban 1993 C 38 51.07 47.01 14.32 5.74 0.19 35.34 0.2 65.02 1993 
Indonesia--Urban 1996 C 38 60.95 37.6 10.66 4.01 0.14 37.54 0.23 74.59 1996 
Indonesia--Urban 1999 C 38 56.85 39.37 10.29 3.74 0.13 35.33 0.21 85.76 1999 
Indonesia--Urban 2002 C 38 71.12 24.24 5.12 1.53 0.06 34.7 0.2 97.34 2002 
Indonesia--Urban 2005 C 38 89.11 18.67 4.06 1.29 0.05 39.93 0.27 109.33 2005 
Indonesia--Urban 2006 C 38 71.35 25.02 5.89 2.01 0.07 35.7 0.21 113.17 2006 
Indonesia--Urban 2007 C 38 80.04 22.36 4.96 1.47 0.06 37.32 0.23 117.02 2007 
Indonesia--Urban 2008 C 38 79.66 21.53 4.75 1.47 0.06 36.68 0.22 120.91 2008 
Indonesia--Urban 2009 C 38 81.54 20.18 4.33 1.33 0.05 37.11 0.23 124.83 2009 
Indonesia--Urban 2010 C 38 90.21 18.33 3.63 0.96 0.04 38.13 0.24 128.81 2010 
Indonesia--Urban 2011 C 38 101.05 17.4 3.22 0.79 0.04 42.15 0.29 0 2011 
 
    45 The SMERU Research Institute 
APPENDIX 8 
Figure A1. Fractile chart by $ PPP per capita per annum, 1984–2011 
 
Figure A1. Fractile chart by $ PPP per capita per annum, 1984–2011 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
  
0.0 
50.0 
100.0 
150.0 
200.0 
250.0 
300.0 
10 100 1000 10000 100000 
Percentage change of consumption per capita 
Fractile Location ($ PPP per capita pa) 
1984 to 2011 Global average $1.25 a day $2 a day $10 a day $50 a day 
Aggregate: HFC 
Filled: Yes 
NA/S option: 1 
Input Criteria 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 C
h
an
ge
 o
f 
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 p
e
r 
C
ap
it
a 
      46 The SMERU Research Institute 
APPENDIX 9 
Figure A2. Fractile chart by $ PPP per capita per annum, 1987–2011 
 
Figure A2. Fractile chart by $ PPP per capita per annum, 1987–2011 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure A3. Fractile chart by $ PPP per capita per annum, 1990–2010 
 
Figure A3. Fractile chart by $ PPP per capita per annum, 1990–2010 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure A4. Density curve, 1984–2011, Indonesia urban 
 
Figure A4. Density curve, 1984–2011, Indonesia urban 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure A5. Density curve, 1984–2011, Indonesia rural 
 
Figure A5. Density curve, 1984–2011, Indonesia rural 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure A6. Total poverty gap (TPG), $1.25 US$bn (PPP) 
 
Figure A6. Total poverty gap (TPG), $1.25 US$bn (PPP) 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure A7. Total poverty gap (TPG), $2 US$bn (PPP) 
 
Figure A7. Total poverty gap (TPG), $2 US$bn (PPP) 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure A8. Total poverty gap (TPG), $10 US$bn (PPP) 
 
Figure A8. Total poverty gap (TPG), $10 US$bn (PPP) 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure A9. Rural poverty as a % total, $1.25 
 
Figure A9. Rural poverty as a % total, $1.25 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure A10. Rural poverty as a % total, $2 
 
Figure A10. Rural poverty as a % total, $2 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Figure A11. Rural poverty as a % total, $10 
 
Figure A11. Rural poverty as a % total, $10 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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